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We investigate an inhomogeneous Ising model in the context of tax evasion dynamics where dif-
ferent types of agents are parametrized via local temperatures and magnetic fields. In particular, we
analyse the impact of backauditing and endogenously determined penalty rates on tax compliance.
Both features contribute to a microfoundation of agent-based econophysics models of tax evasion.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the first approaches to theoretically account for
tax compliance was given by Allingham and Sandmo1,
which incorporates tax rates, potential penalties and au-
dit probabilities as basic parameters in order to evaluate
the behavior of expected utility maximizing tax payers.
However, it was realized early on that one of the major
shortcomings of the Allingham and Sandmo theory is the
prediction of much too low levels of tax compliance, as
actually observed in industrialized nations. It is believed
that these shortcomings are partially due to the insuf-
ficient consideration of interaction dynamics among the
actors of the tax compliance game, i.e., tax payers, tax
advisors, tax authorities, and tax law makers. Another
reason might be that many analyses have not incorpo-
rated backauditing. Although Allingham and Sandmo
already considered backauditing (or lapse of time effects)
as a possible extension of their basic theory, the issue of
backauditing has been largely neglected in the literature.
Noteable exceptions are Alm et al.16, Antunes et al.12
and Hokamp and Pickhardt15.
It is for these reasons that agent-based models have
been set up as a comparatively new tool for analyzing
tax compliance issues. In fact, an essential feature of
any agent-based model is the direct non-market based
interaction among agents, which is combined with some
process that allows for changes in individual behavior
patterns. Therefore, agent-based tax evasion models may
be categorized according to the features of this individual
interaction process. In econophysics models this process
is commonly described within the Ising model2 where
examples include Zaklan et al.3,4, Lima and Zaklan5, and
Lima6.
In contrast, if the interaction process is driven by pa-
rameter changes that induce behavioral changes via a
utility function and (or) by stochastic processes that do
not have physical roots, these models belong to the eco-
nomics domain. Examples include Mittone and Patelli7,
Davis et al.8, Bloomquist9,10, Korobow et al.11, An-
tunes et al.12, Szabo´ et al.13, Meder et al.14, Hokamp
and Pickhardt15, of which some are summarized by
Bloomquist10 and Pickhardt and Seibold24.
In all agent-based tax evasion models the actual pat-
terns and levels of tax evasion depend on two additional
factors: the network structure of society and the tax en-
forcement mechanism. The network structure is imple-
mented by alternative lattice types and tax enforcement
consists of the two economic standard parameters audit
probability and penalty rate.
In the present paper we study the effect of alter-
native backauditing schemes on tax evasion within an
multi-agent econophysics model. Moreover, backaudit-
ing also enables us to incorporate endogenously deter-
mined penalty rates. Both features, backauditing and
endogenous penalties, contribute to the microfoundation
of econophysics models and, therefore, allow for a more
realistic modelling of tax compliance behavior within this
modelling frame.
We present our model and formalism in Sec. II. Results
are analyzed in Sec. III, where we discuss first the case
of homogeneous societies in Sec. III A, which is then
compared with the tax evasion of multi agent societies in
Sec. III B. We conclude our considerations in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL AND FORMALISM
Our considerations are based on the Ising model, de-
scribed by the following hamiltonian,
H =
∑
ij
JijSiSj +
∑
i
Bi (1)
where Jij describes the coupling of Ising variables (spins)
Si = −1,1 between lattice sites Ri and Rj . In the
present context Si = 1 is interpreted as a compliant
tax payer and Si = −1 as a non-compliant one. We
implement the model on a two-dimensional 1000× 1000
square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions Jij ≡ J
for |Ri − Rj | = 1 (lattice constant a ≡ 1). We expect
that our results are robust with regard to variations of
the network structure in analogy to the investigations of
Zaklan et al. Ref.3. Eq. (1) contains also the coupling of
the spins to a local magnetic field Bi which together with
a local temperature Ti distinguishes the behaviorally dif-
ferent types of agents. Concerning the latter we assume
that it is imposed by the coupling of each lattice site i
to a heat-bath with temperature Ti
20, as if it were part
of a canonical ensemble. We then use the heat-bath al-
gorithm [cf.17] in order to evaluate statistical averages of
the model. The probability for a spin at lattice site i to
take the values Si = ±1 is given by
pi(Si) =
1
1 + exp{−[E(−Si)− E(Si)]/Ti}
(2)
2and E(−Si)− E(Si) is the energy change for a spin-flip
at site i. Upon picking a random number 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 the
spin takes the value Si = 1 when r < pi(Si = 1) and
Si = −1 otherwise. One time step then corresponds to a
complete sweep through the lattice. We note that a gen-
eralization of the model with regard to the incorporation
of non-equilibrium dynamics has been recently proposed
in Refs.6,18,19.
Following Ref.15 we consider societies which are com-
posed of the following four types of agents: (i) selfish a-
type agents, which take advantage from non-compliance
and, thus, are characterized by Bi/Ti < 0 and |Bi| > J ;
(ii) copying b-type agents, which copy tax behavior of
their social environment or neighborhood. This can be
modelled by Bi << J and J/Ti >∼ 1; (iii) ethical c-type
agents, which are practically always compliant and which
are parametrized by Bi/Ti > 0 and |Bi| > J ; (iv) ran-
dom d-type agents which are in principle like c-types, but
due to some confusion caused by tax law complexity act
by chance within a certain range. We implement this
behavior by Bi << J and J/Ti << 1. Here and in the
following all parameters are measured with respect to
J ≡ 1. Note that with regard to the previous definitions
the analysis in Ref.4 corresponds to homogeneous soci-
eties of b- and d-type agents. Moreover, the model in
Ref.5 studies homogeneous societies of a-type and c-type
agents. Our aim instead is the investigation of hetero-
geneous societies and the influence of different backaudit
schemes and endogenously determined penalty rates on
the extend of tax evasion.
We consider first the case where the detection of an
evading agent in the current period enforces its compli-
ance over the following h time steps or periods. Note
that in econophysics models of tax evasion h is regarded
as the penalty rate. The aforementioned procedure has
been invoked in Refs.3,4,6,24 and also implemented in a
randomized variant in Ref.5. In Ref.5 h has been inter-
preted as the time over which an agent is ashamed and
feels guilty about his behavior after detection. An al-
ternative interpretation would be definite audits by the
tax authorities over h time steps after an agent has been
detected for the first time, a scheme that is known as
conditional future auditing (Alm et al.16). In addition,
we study the situation where an audit may also allow for
screening the agent’s tax declaration over several years in
the past (backaudit). The basic idea is that a backaudit
is only performed by the tax authorities upon reason-
able initial suspicion, which in our model corresponds
to tax evasion in the current period. In the literature
this scheme is known as conditional backauditing (see
Alm et al.16). We therefore introduce a probability pa
with which an audit is performed at a given lattice site
(agent). If tax evasion is detected in the current pe-
riod, the backaudit comprises also an inspection of the
preceding bp time steps. Denote with ne the number of
time steps over which the agent was evading during the
backaudited periods plus the current period. Then the
number of future periods k, over which the agent is forced
to be compliant, is set to k = ne ∗ h. Thus, the penalty
rate k is now endogenously determined. Note, however,
that the above limit of a fixed number of enforced fu-
ture compliance periods h is recovered in the limit of no
backaudit bp = 0.
III. RESULTS
In this section we will first present results for the case
of homogeneous societies consisting of either a, b, c- or
d-type agents. This allows for extracting their specific
behavior patterns under the three different audit schemes
which we consider: (i) bp = 0 with penalty rate h = 4, (ii)
bp = 5 with penalty rate k, (iii) bp = 10 with penalty rate
k. It turns out that agent behavior is partially modified
in a heterogeneous society due to interaction dynamics
between different agent groups.
A. Homogeneous societies
Fig. 1 displays the tax evasion dynamics for a homo-
geneous system of selfish a-type agents. The endogenous
preference with regard to non-compliance is incorporated
by a negative field B = −15, which is large in magnitude
both with regard to the exchange coupling J ≡ 1 and the
temperature scale T = 5.
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FIG. 1: Tax evasion dynamics for a society of a-type agents
(temperature T = 5, external field B = −15). The upper
(lower) panels display tax evasion for backaudit period bp = 5
(bp = 10). In both panels the dashed line corresponds to
bp = 0 and h = 4. In all cases the audit probability is set to
pa = 5%.
As initial condition we set the value of all agents to −1,
i.e. 100% tax evasion25. The upper left panel of Fig. 1
compares the time evolution for the extend of tax evasion
in case of no backauditing (bp = 0) and a fixed compliance
period h = 4 (audit probability pa = 5%) with backaudit-
ing (bp = 5). Note that in the latter case the maximum
3penalty is k = 6 ∗ 4 = 24 since the current period is in-
cluded in the counting of total evasion periods ne. Up
to time step ti = 6 the dynamics of both methods are
undistinguishable, whereas for ti > 6 tax evasion with-
out backauditing (bp = 0) rapidly saturates in contrast
to the curve with backauditing. In fact, since we start
from 100% tax evasion it is unlikely that for the small
pa we are considering an agent which has been forced to
compliance, is audited. Therefore, in both methods the
extend of tax evasion is initially reduced in each time step
by pa, i.e. decreasing to 95% , 90% , 85% , 80% in time
step ti = 2, 3, 4 , 5. Agents detected in period ti = 1 can
start to cheat again in period ti = 6. In case of no back-
auditing this fraction of evading agents will be almost
compensated by the newly detected evadors which drives
the system into the stationary state. On the other hand,
backauditing (bp = 5) forces agents which have been de-
tected in ti > 1 to stay compliant over a larger period so
that the corresponding curve continues to decrease. The
following small upward spikes occur when these agents
turn to non-compliance again. The decrease continues
until agents can acquire the maximum compliance pe-
riod of 24 time steps. This is the case after time step
ti = 30 where agents which have been convicted in pe-
riod ti = 6 return to non-compliance. As a consequence
the tax evasion probability starts to increase again and
slowly approaches a stationary state. The upper right
main panel illustrates the time evolution of the average
compliance period of detected agents. As anticipated, it
rapidly increases within the first 6 time steps and con-
verges to a stationary value of k ≈ 21 after ∼ 80 time
steps. Note that the average k is smaller than the maxi-
mum value of k = 24 due to detected agents which have
been compliant within previous bp = 5 time steps. The
corresponding distribution is shown in the inset to the
upper right panel of Fig. 1. Clearly, most of the de-
tected agents (∼ 75%) are penalized with a compliance
period of k = 24, whereas the the remaining 25% are
forced to compliance over 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 time steps with
almost equal probability of ∼ 5%. The lower two panels
of Fig. 1 analyze the analogous situation for the larger
backaudit period of bp = 10. Clearly this reduces even
more the percentage of tax evasion with respect to no
backauditing, but on the other hand increases the tran-
sient oscillation towards the stationary state.
Fig. 2 displays the situation for a homogeneous soci-
ety of copying b-type agents which are characterized by
B = 0 and T = 2, i.e. the temperature is below the
ordering transition of the two-dimensional Ising model
Tc ≈ 2.269. Therefore, b-type agents are guided by a line
of action which copies the behavior of its neighbors (i.e.
sites which are coupled by J ≡ 1). As initial condition all
agents are set to full compliance (tax evasion 0%). Due to
the small but finite temperature some of the agents occa-
sionally change to non-compliance. However, the small
audit probability implies also a small probability that
agents are detected twice or more often within bp time
steps. Therefore, for both backaudit periods bp = 5, 10
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FIG. 2: Same as Fig. 1 but for a society of b-type agents
(temperature T = 2, external field B = 0).
the majority of agents is sconced with a compliance pe-
riod of k = 4 (cf. insets to the right panels of Fig. 2)
so that the average compliance period is only slightly
larger than in case of no backaudit bp = 0 (cf. main
right panels). As a result, one obtains a small station-
ary value of tax evasion of ∼ 4% after ∼ 15 time steps
where the curves with and without backaudit are prac-
tically indistinguishable (cf. left panels of Fig. 2). It
should be noted that the stationary value is independent
of the initial condition. Even in case of 100% tax eva-
sion in time step ti = 1 the detected agents have a small
probability to return to non-compliance resulting in the
same stationary value after a somewhat longer transient
oscillation of ∼ 30− 40 time steps.
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FIG. 3: Same as Fig. 1 but for a society of c-type agents
(temperature T = 5, external field B = +15).
The case of ethical c-type agents is shown in Fig. 3.
These are modeled by a strong positive field B = 15 (i.e.
B/J > 1 and B/T > 1 with T = 5) which enforces com-
pliant behavior. This strong field suppresses the prob-
ability for a behavioral change towards non-compliance.
4From the right panels of Fig. 3 one can see that the av-
erage compliance period is dominantly k = 4 (cf. insets),
with incidental spikes when some of the agents are de-
tected twice within bp time steps. Therefore, the number
of spikes increases upon increasing the backaudit period
from bp = 5 to bp = 10. In any case, backauditing has
only a minor effect on c-type agents and the tax eva-
sion rapidly approaches a rather small stationary value
of ∼ 5 · 10−4, which would tend to zero in the limit
B/J,B/T →∞.
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FIG. 4: Same as Fig. 1 but for a society of d-type agents
(temperature T = 20, external field B = 0).
Finally, Fig. 4 displays the case of a homogeneous soci-
ety of d-type agents which act independently from other
agents and, thus, are characterized by a large temper-
ature T = 20 and B = 0. Setting as initial condition
all agents to compliance, the large temperature induces
a change to non-compliance for almost half of the soci-
ety within the first two time steps (cf. left panels of Fig.
4). Then the audit mechanisms drive the system again
towards the stationary states, which in case of d-type
agents is different for the cases with and without back-
auditing. In fact, since d-type agents act independently
we expect them on average to be half of the time com-
pliant and non-compliant, respectively. The backaudit
within bp+1 time steps (i.e. including the current period)
thus leads to an average enforced compliance period of
k = h · (bp+1)/2. This agrees with the stationary values
of the average compliance curves shown in the right pan-
els of Fig. 4 and the actual distribution is shown in the
insets. The increased compliance period under backau-
diting results in a smaller stationary value of tax evasion,
as can be seen in the left panels of Fig. 4. Naturally, this
value decreases with the length of the backaudit period
bp.
B. Heterogeneous societies
We continue our investigations by considering soci-
eties which contain all four behaviorly different types
of agents. In order to account for heterogeneity also
within the individual agent groups, we allow for parame-
ter variations concerning the characterizing temperature
Tmin ≤ T ≤ Tmax and fields Bmin ≤ B ≤ Bmax. Table
I specifies the parameter windows used in the following
analysis which correspond to a flat distribution around
the same mean values used for the homogeneous societies
in the previous subsection.
The results shown in Figs. 5, 6, 7 have been obtained
for societies with a fixed share of 35% b-type and 15%
d-type agents. We then investigate the influence of differ-
ent population shares of selfish a-type and ethical c-type
agents on the extend of tax evasion and on tax evasion
dynamics.
TABLE I: Parameter set for the results shown in Figs. 5 to
7. Note that T and B are measured in units of J ≡ 1.
Agent− type Tmin Tmax Bmin Bmax
a 5 5 -20 -10
b 1 3 0 0
c 5 5 10 20
d 10 30 0 0
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FIG. 5: Tax evasion dynamics for a society consisting of 50%
a-type, 35% b-type, and 15% d-type agents. The upper left
panel compares the extend of tax evasion and the dynamics
of tax evasion for backaudit periods bp = 0 and bp = 5. The
lower left panel breaks down the evasion probability to the
individual agent types in case of backaudit period bp = 5.
The upper right panel displays the average forced compliance
period (or penalty) for the individual agent types and the
lower right panels show the corresponding distribution. Audit
probability is pa = 5% in each case.
In Fig. 5 the percentage of a-type agents is set to
50% and the upper left panel compares the extend of tax
evasion and the dynamics of tax evasion for backaudit
periods bp = 0 and bp = 5. The lower left panel reveals
the contributions of the individual agent groups. With
respect to the steady state it turns out that the a-type
5agents contribute with ∼ 25% to the overall tax evasion,
which means that ∼ 50% of a-type agents are evading
in agreement with the result for the homogeneous a-type
society in Fig. 1. Similarly, the d-type agents contribute
with ∼ 5% to tax evasion so that approximately 30% of
this group is evading, again in agreement with the homo-
geneous result displayed in Fig. 4. A new feature arises
due to the interaction of copying b-type agents with their
neighbors. In fact, we observe a corresponding contribu-
tion of ∼ 10% to overall tax evasion, which means that
∼ 28% of b-type agents are evading, compared to 4%
in the homogeneous society (Fig. 2). This is of course
due to the interaction with a-type and to a much smaller
extend with d-type agents. As a result the average com-
pliance period of b-types reaches now the value of d-types
(upper right panel of Fig. 5), which, together with the a-
types, acquire approximately the same value than in the
homogeneous case. Also inspection of the forced compli-
ance period (or penalty) distributions (lower right panels
of Fig. 5) reveals a much broader spreading as compared
to Fig. 2, with the maximum at 12 periods.
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FIG. 6: Same as Fig. 5 but for a society consisting of 35%
b-type, 50% c-type, and 15% d-type agents.
The copying feature of b-type agents has much less
influence on tax evasion when we replace the 50% a-type
by 50% ethical c-type agents, as shown in Fig. 6. In
fact, because in the stationary state the large majority
of b-types tends to be compliant, the result of Fig. 6
corresponds almost to the result one would obtain by just
averaging the results of Figs. 2,3,4, taking into account
the parameter distributions.
The case of a society with all four types of agents is
shown in Fig. 7. Here, those b-types which are the near-
est neighbors of a-type agents are predominantly evading,
whereas b-types which are the nearest neighbors of c-
types copy the corresponding compliant behavior. In ad-
dition, also the fluctuating behavior of d-types is copied
by neighboring b-types, similarly to the previous figures
5, 6, 7. As a result, we find that almost ∼ 20% of b-types
are evading, a value slightly lower than in Fig. 5, but still
larger than in the homogeneous case. Inspection of the
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FIG. 7: Same as Fig. 5 but for a society consisting of 30%
a-type, 35% b-type, 20% c-type, and 15% d-type agents.
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FIG. 8: Same as Fig. 7 but for backaudit period bp = 10.
distribution of the compliance period for b-type agents
yields a compromise between the situations shown in Fig.
5 and Fig. 6. In any case, the introduction of backaudit-
ing bp = 5 reduces the overall tax evasion from ∼ 45% to
∼ 27%.
Finally, we want to briefly address the influence of the
penalty parameter h as compared to the backaudit pe-
riod bp. In fact, one could argue that for a given soci-
ety, tax evasion for e.g. h = 4 and bp = 5 should be
equivalent to h = 2 and bp = 11 since in both cases
the maximum compliance period of detected evadors is
kmax = (bp + 1) · h = 24. This would be true for soci-
eties of ideal a- or c-type agents which are either always
evading or compliant with probability ’one’ (i.e. where
Bi → ±∞). However, in our model we consider the case
of finite fields and, moreover, also incorporate b- and d-
types with a pronounced distribution of penalty periods
(cf. Figs. 2, 4). For h = 2 and h = 4 this distribution
spans the values k = 2, 4, 6 . . .24 and k = 4, 8, 12 . . .24,
respectively. Therefore a given penalty period k4 of the
6h = 4 computation encompasses two penalty periods
(k2 = k4 and k2 − 1) of the h = 2 result and, therefore,
shifts the average compliance period to slightly larger
values. As a result, tax evasion for parameters h and
bp = 4n + 3 is always slighlty smaller than for 2h and
bp = 2n+ 1 with n integer.
C. Phase diagrams
In the previous section we have seen that copying b-
type agents cause the extend of tax evasion of hetero-
geneous societies to be different from the corresponding
average of homogeneous societies. As noted, this is due to
the interaction of b-type agents with behaviorally differ-
ent types of agents in their neighborhood and the actual
interaction dynamics is governed by various parameters,
including the agent-type distribution in the population.
Therefore, in Figs. 9a,b,c we show the stationary tax
evasion as a function of the percentage of b-type agents
for no backauditing (bp = 0) and backauditing (bp =
5, 10), respectively. As we are predominantly interested
in the antagonistic influence of a- and c-type agents, the
percentage of d-types has been set to zero. The individual
curves in Figs. 9a,b,c represent different percentages of c-
type agents, so that increasing the value on the horizontal
axis b = 1− a− c corresponds to a decrease of the share
of a-type agents.
Consider first the c = 0 curve in Figs. 9a,b,c which dis-
plays a crossover behavior (visualized through the thin
solid lines) as a function of b-types. In the vicinity of
b = 0 the vast majority of agents is a-type and the speck-
les of b-types tend to copy the a-type behavior. The
reason why tax evasion slightly decreases with the num-
ber of b-types is due to the fact that the latter have a
larger probability of staying compliant, even in an evad-
ing environment (cf. table III in Ref.24). On average this
probability is ≈ 15% which coincides with the slope of
the c = 0 curve in Fig. 9 independent of the value of bp.
In contrast, the behavior around b = 1 can be un-
derstood from a society of predominantly b-type agents
with speckles of a-types. In this limit every a-type con-
tributes to tax evasion proportionally to the correspond-
ing value of the homogeneous society tehom(a) (cf. Fig.
1). In addition, since each a-type agent is surrounded
by four b-types, the latter have a larger probability of
tax evasion and contribute with ∼ 4a · teneighbor(b). The
residual fraction of-types ∼ b−4a contributes again with
the value of the homogeneous society tehom(b) (cf. Fig.
2). Note that due to the coupling to the a-types one has
teneighbor(b) ≫ tehom(b) and it is exactly due to these
neighbors that the slope in Fig. 9a exceeds the value of
’one’. Since both tehom(a) and tehom(b) increase with
the backaudit period bp we find a decrease of slope for
the tangent around b = 1 going from Fig. 9a to Fig. 9c.
Finally, consider the horizontal dashed line at 30% tax
evasion in Figs. 9a,b,c. This line shows all combinations
of different behavioral agent types that are compatible
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FIG. 9: Stationary values for the extend of tax evasion for
audit probability pa = 5% as a function of b-types. The
individual curves are for different percentages of c-type agents
and the fraction of d-types is set to zero. The stationary value
is obtained as an average over 30 time steps after the system is
thermalized within 270 time steps. We have indicated the tax
evasion for 100% a-types (b-types, c-types) by a solid circle
denoted A (diamond denoted B, square denoted C). The thin
solid lines tangent to the c = 0 curve at b = 0, 1, respectively,
visualize the crossover behavior discussed in the text. Panel
a): No backauditing bp = 0, h = 4. Panel b): Backauditing
bp = 5 and h = 4. Panel c): Backauditing bp = 10 and
h = 4. The horizontal dashed line at 30% tax evasion is also
discussed in the text.
with 30% tax evasion, subject to the underlying param-
eter specifications. Inspection of Fig. 9 shows that the
increase of the backauditing period not only reduces tax
evasion for a given agent distribution, but also the possi-
7ble combinations of agent-types that allow for a specific
level of tax evasion (e.g. 30%). Given that these specifi-
cations are implemented in a lab experiment with human
subjects, it should be possible to derive some information
on how closely the agent-based model can predict real
human behavior patterns.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have implemented alternative back-
auditing schemes, in combination with an endogenously
penalty, into a multi-agent econophysics model. Our in-
vestigations essentially confirm the results of a few pre-
vious analyses on backauditing obtained from a lab ex-
periment with human subjects16 and from agent-based
models of the economics domain12,15. In particular, our
results show that the compliance rate may increase sub-
stantially with the number of backauditing periods, sub-
ject to the underlying agent type distribution. To this
extent, our findings support the view that introducing
long backauditing periods (or lapse of time periods) via
tax laws will effectively reduce the level of tax evasion.
Naturally, a-type agents due to their inherent selfish
behavior are most affected by backaudits. In addition, we
have shown that through backauditing a-types strongly
influence the endogeneous compliance of b-types, which
can be deduced from the b-type compliance distribution
in Figs. 5, 6. However, the higher the share of c-types, i.e.
the higher the tax morale in a society, the less effective
a backauditing scheme will be. This notwithstanding, a
given level of tax evasion may be compatible with differ-
ent agent type compositions. For example, according to
Fig. 9 (dashed horizontal line), a society with observed
30% tax evasion could contain a share of ethical c-types
ranging from c = 0% up to c ≈ 62% (panel a), c ≈ 40%
(panel b), and c ≈ 20% (panel c), subject to the under-
lying parameter setting.
Finally, the incorporation of behaviorally different
agent-types, backauditing, and endogenous penalties,
adds to the microfoundation of econophysics models and
allows for comparing results obtained from such a model
with those obtained from human-subject-based lab ex-
periments. As noted, this may permit an empirical de-
termination of the parameters of our model and, in turn,
a prediction of the extend of tax evasion under different
parameter values. But, of course, this deliniates a future
reserach agenda.
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